Third Party Beneficiary Enforce Arbitration Agreement

This case resolves only part of the issue of the extension of the compromise clause contained in a third-party contract with respect to the beneficiary: this extension should be admitted when the third-party beneficiary invokes the compromise clause (thus expressing his agreement). NZone also argued that the direct benefits areoppel requires conciliation. The direct benefit is that if “the alleged liability arises exclusively from the contract or must be determined by reference to it – equity prevents a person from circumventing the arbitration clause that was part of the agreement[[]][s]] expressed, a person cannot have his contract and defeat it.” 4 The Fifth Circuit rejected NZone`s argument of direct benefits because workers` rights were attributed to the general obligations of the FLSA and not to the contract between the workers and RigUp and that “the applicants derive no benefit from their agreements with RigUp”. However, as a result of a different structure and drafting of the contract in question, direct benefits have been granted.5 [3] Article V, paragraph 2 of the New York Convention provides that a country in which recognition and enforcement is sought may refuse enforcement if the dispute could not be resolved by arbitration in that country. With regard to arbitration agreements, the Swiss Supreme Court has consistently applied the form requirements of written consent to conciliation (Article 1781 of the General Law of Private Law, Article 1781), while advocating a complete interpretation of the scope of such consent, which at one point is contrary to the agreement of relativity of contractual obligations3. The Swiss Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this practice. It confirmed the extension of a compromise clause agreed under a complex restructuring regime to one of the companies benefiting from such a restructuring, even though the company is not officially a party to the restructuring agreement and has signed it4. The First Circuit confirmed that there was no legal basis for forcing Hogan to arbitration if the clear terms of the agreement showed that Hogan did not agree to settle his claims against SPAR. The Court states that SPAR was not a third party beneficiary of the agreement. In order to determine whether a party is a third party beneficiary, a court examines the specific terms of the contract to determine the intent of the parties. In this regard, the Tribunal stated that the clear language of the compromise clause limited its applicability to signatories by covering only disputes between “the parties”, so it is clear that it does not grant any arbitration rights to SPAR or another third party.